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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
died before this date ?m Would there be personal income tax problems
raised for the one or two shareholders ?s In all corporate litigation
where the cause of action arose before July 1, 1957, would the one or
two stockholders be the real party or parties in interest ?39 Did the
corporate status come and go before July 1, 1957, depending on whether
at any given time there were at least three shareholders or less than that
number?4° Unfortunately the answers to these and other questions will
have to be determined on a case by case basis.
JoHN G. SHAW
Criminal Law-Inciting To Riot
In State v. Cole- the Ku Klux Klan burned two crosses in the county
and publicized a meeting to be held later in the week, the purpose of
which was to intimidate the Indian population of the county. Before
the day of the meeting the sheriff was apprised of tension growing among
the Indians of the county. He went to defendant Cole, who claimed to
be the Grand Wizard of the Klan, and told him that it would be danger-
ous to hold the meeting, but the meeting was not cancelled. As mem-
bers of the Klan began appearing with firearms at the appointed place
for the meeting, Indians of the county appeared with firearms and shoot-
ing began. Several hundred shots were fired before law enforcement
officers coiad restore order. There was no further attempt to convene
the meeting. The defendants Cole and Martin (and others to the
State unknown) were indicted for inciting to riot, in that they willfully
and unlawfully, while armed with firearms, assembled with the intent
to preach racial dissension and coerce and intimidate the populace, and
with the common intent to carry out such purpose in a violent manner
to the terror of the people and to assist each other against all who should
oppose them. The defendants were convicted, and the Supreme Court
upheld defendant Cole's conviction of inciting to riot (defendant
Martin's conviction was reversed on other grounds). In so doing the
court recognized that inciting to riot and riot are separate and distinct
offenses and said:
[I]nciting to riot is a common law offense, the gist of which is
its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace, though the parties
" This question was raised in Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 48, 50 (1957).
" This question was raised by Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- ot
Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. Rv. 471, 479 (1956).
" This question was raised by Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- or
Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. Rxv. 471, 479 (1956).
o This question was raised in 250 N.C. at 570, 109 S.E.2d at 267 (dissent).
Judge Bobbitt also dissented in the Park Terrace case on its original hearing. If
his point of view had been adopted, several problems in North Carolina corpora-
tion law might have been avoided.
1249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
first assembled for an innocent purpose .... "Inciting to riot. ..
means such a course of conduct, by the use of words, signs or
language, or any other means by which one can be urged to action,
as would naturally lead or urge other men to engage in or enter
upon conduct which, if completed, would make a riot.' 2
The court also stated that the defendants could not have been convicted
of inciting to riot unless the incitement resulted in a riot.
A survey of the cases pertaining to the crime of inciting to riot, ex-
clusive of the principal case, discloses that there are seemingly only two
jurisdictions that have dealt directly with the crime of inciting to riot,
Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. Apparently the earliest
case of record in the United States recognizing inciting to riot to 'be an
indictable offense was decided in 1824.4
The American cases make it clear that riot and inciting to riot are
separate and distinct offenses.5 In cases where no riot has occurred, but
where the defendant's acts or words were such as to imply that they
were committed or said with the intent to provoke a riot or with willful
disregard of their probable consequences, convictions of inciting to riot
have been upheld.6 In an early case one court, in discussing the problem,
said that an averment that a riot resulted is not necessary to a convic-
tion of inciting to riot.7 In most of the cases the defendant has been
indicted for inciting to riot and riot.8 Where a riot was found to have
1Id. at 741, 107 S.E.2d at 738, quoting Commonwealth v. Sciullo, 169 Pa. Super.
318, 321, 82 A2d 695, 697 (1951).
'Riot is defined as a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more
persons assembling together of their own authority with an intent mutually to assist
one another against all who shall oppose them, and afterwards putting the design
into execution in a terrific and violent manner, whether the object in question be
lawful gr otherwise. State v. Hoffman, 199 N.C. 328, 154 S.E. 314 (1930) ; State
v. Stalcup, 23 N.C. 30 (1840).
'Commonwealth v. Haines, 4 Clark (Pa.) 17 (1824).
r State v. Cole, 249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959); Commonwealth v.
Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 Atl. 515 (1939); Commonwealth v. Safis, 122
Pa. Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936); Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super.
482 (1917).
o Commonwealth v. Sciullo, 169 Pa. Super. 318, 82 A.2d 695 (1951) ; Common-
wealth v. Frankfeld, 114 Pa. Super. 262, 173 Atl. 834 (1934) ; Commonwealth v.
Egan, 113 Pa. Super. 375, 173 AtI. 764 (1934).
In England inciting to riot seems to be a properly indictable offense when no
riot-or even assembly-occurred. No reported cases were found but there is a
"preceden' (apparently based on an unreported case) on inciting to riot, where
the first count of the indictment alleged that as a result of the incitement there was
an assembly, and the second count alleged the inciting and omitted the assembling
in consequence of it 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES 381 (9th ed. 1877) ; see CROWN CIRCUIT
ASSISTANT 167 (1788) ; CROWN CIRcuIr COMPANION 420 (1st Amer. ed. 1816) ; 2
CHrrry, CRImINAL LAW § 506 (1841); 3 Bisnop, NEW CRImINAL PRoCEDURR §
999(4) (1913).
'United States v. Fenwick, 25 Fed. Cas. 1062 (No. 15086) (D.C. Cir. 1836).
8 Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 At. 515 (1938) ; Com-
monwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 Ati. 177 (1936) ; Commonwealth v.
Egan, 113 Pa. Super. 375, 173 Atl. 764 (1934) ; Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa.
Super. 482 (1917); United States v. Fenwick, 25 Fed. Cas. 1062 (No. 15086)
(D.C. Cir. 1836).
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occurred, the court in one case upheld a conviction without stating
whether this was done on one or both counts, 9 while two cases indicated
that the conviction could be upheld on either or both counts.10 However,
it has also been said that the lesser crime of inciting to riot may become
merged in the more serious crime of riot,' and apparently one conviction
has been affirmed on that basis.'2
Although basically in accord with the American cases, the English
cases have gone to the extent of holding that one who incites, encourages,
promotes, or abets a riot may be held as a principal rioter,18 even though
he takes no active part in the riot or is not present when it occurs.14
The only American case found that has considered this latter point mere-
ly recognized that the common law permitted this to be done.'5
While there is accord between the American and English cases on
the proposition that even though no riot ensues the defendant's conduct
may nevertheless be the basis for a conviction of inciting to riot,", this
may not be the law in North Carolina, as indicated by dictum to the
contrary in the Cole case. It is submitted that if North Carolina con-
tinues to require that the riot be proved, the indictment should contain
charges for inciting to riot and riot, and the conviction should be for riot,
or possibly, as warranted by some of the Pennsylvania cases,' 7 for in-
citing to riot and riot.
THOMAs L. Noxus, JR.
'United States v. Fenwick, supra note 8.
0 "Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 At. 515 (1938); Com-
monwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936).11 Commonwealth v. Apriceno, supra note 10; Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa.
Super. 482 (1917). The application of "merger" may be questioned if the strict
common law definition of merger is adhered to: "The common law rule was that,
if the offenses were of different degrees, there was a merger, but not if they
were of the same degree. Misdemeanors merged in felonies ... and conspiracy to
commit a felony in the felony, if committed. But there was no merger of a felony
in a felony ... Nor was there any merger of a misdemeanor in a misdemeanor,
as of an attempt or conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor in the misdemeanor when
committed." Cx.&iuc & MARSHALL, CRIMEs, 103 (6th ed. 1958). See also Graff v.
People, 208 Ill. 312, 70 N.E. 299 (1904).
12 Commonwealth v. Merrick, supra note 11.13Regina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox C.C. 288, 12 L.T.O.S. 537 (1848); Clifford v.
Brandon, 2 Camp. 358, 170 Eng. Rep. 1183 (Com. Pl. 1809); Rex v. Royce, 4
Burr. 2073, 98 Eng. Rep. 81 (K.B. 1767) ; Anonymous, 12 Mod. Rep. 509, 88 Eng.
Rep. 1482 (K.B. 1702). Compare: "In misdemeanors there are no degrees, but all
who participate in them are principals and may be charged as such and convicted
upon proof of having taken any part therein." Commonwealth v. Jaffas, 284 Mass.
417, 419, 188 N.E. 263, 264 (1933).
:' "It is not the hand that strikes the blow, or throws the stone that is alone
guilty under the circumstances; but that he who inflames people's minds and in-
duces them, by violent means, to accomplish an illegal object, is himself a rioter,
though he takes no part in the riot.' Regina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox C.C. 288 (1848).
" Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super. 482 (1917).
" This is also in accord with the English law relating to inciting to other crimes.
Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1801); see generally, 14
ENGLSH & EmPIrE DIGEST, Part I, § 6(7) (1956).
17 Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 At. 515 (1938) ; Com-
monwealth v. Sais, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936).
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